What’s in it for me? Incentive-compatible route coordination of crowdsourced resources by Bassem, Christine & Bestavros, Azer
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Computer Science CAS: Computer Science: Technical Reports
2016-03-30
What’s in it for me?
Incentive-compatible route
coordination of crowdsourced
resources
Bassem, Christine; Bestavros, Azer. Incentive-Compatible Route Coordination of
Crowdsourced Resources. Technical Report BU-CS-TR 2016-004, Computer Science
Department, Boston University, March 30, 2016.
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/21782
Boston University
What’s in It for Me? Incentive Compatible Route
Coordination of Crowdsourced Resources
Christine Bassem
Computer Science Department
Wellesley College
Wellesley, MA
Email: cbassem@wellesley.edu
Azer Bestavros
Computer Science Department
Boston University
Boston, MA
Email: best@bu.edu
Abstract—With the recent trend in crowdsourcing, i.e., us-
ing the power of crowds to assist in satisfying demand, the
pool of resources suitable for GeoPresen-ce-capable systems has
expanded to include already roaming devices, such as mobile
phones, and moving vehicles. We envision an environment, in
which the motion of these crowdsourced mobile resources is
coordinated, according to their preexisting schedules to satisfy
geo-temporal demand on a mobility field. In this paper, we
propose an incentive compatible route coordination mechanism
for crowdsourced resources, in which participating mobile agents
satisfy geo-temporal requests in return for monetary rewards. We
define the Flexible Route Coordination (FRC) problem, in which
an agent’s flexibility is exploited to maximize the coverage of a
mobility field, with an objective to maximize the revenue collected
from satisfied paying requests. Given that the FRC problem is
NP-hard, we define an optimal algorithm to plan the route of a
single agent on a graph with evolving labels, then we use that
algorithm to define a 1
2
-approximation algorithm to solve the
problem in its general model, with multiple agents. Moreover,
we define an incentive compatible, rational, and cash-positive
payment mechanism, which guarantees that an agent’s truthful-
ness about its flexibility is an ex-post Nash equilibrium strategy.
Finally, we analyze the proposed mechanisms theoretically, and
evaluate their performance experimentally using real mobility
traces from urban environments.
I. INTRODUCTION
The continuing advances in mobile technology allow for
the seamless integration of applications and physical entities,
creating GeoPresence-capable systems that can transform the
way people collect, analyze and use data. We refer to the
ability of an application to access physical devices under some
geo-temporal constraints as GeoPresence (GP) [4].
GP-capable systems have long existed in the form of
dedicated infrastructures, in which mobile sensory devices are
owned and controlled by an authority. In such infrastructure-
based systems, such as sensor networks [2], robotic systems
[11], [19], and dedicated vehicle systems [20], [7], the sole
function of the sensory mobile devices is to act as resources
for satisfying geo-temporal demand, such as sensory queries,
and ride requests. These dedicated systems excel in satisfying
demand with high quality of service, but are costly to build,
scale, and maintain.
In a smart urban environment, humans are in control of
technologically advanced mobile devices, such as phones and
vehicles, which are no longer being used for mere commu-
nication and transportation purposes, but can also be used
as mobile sensors and actuators. With the recent trend of
crowdsourcing, GP-capable systems no longer need to be built
on dedicated infrastructures, and participating self-motivated
crowds already roaming in a mobility field can be used to
assist in satisfying geo-temporal demand. In such systems,
crowdsourced resources are not owned by an authority, and
their participation is opportunistic, and often unpredictable.
Existing GP-capable systems that depend on crowdsourced
resources, such as in urban sensing systems [5], crowd-based
query answering systems [16], and Uber [28], usually act
as brokers between these crowdsourced resources (agents),
and the geo-temporal demand for them. The broker is not
involved in the request allocation/assignment decision process,
and decisions are either made by the supply or the demand
side, with the broker acting as a facilitator of communication.
We envision an environment, in which the system does not
own the mobile resources, or have the ability to force them
to follow predefined mobility schedules, but rather acts as a
broker that coordinates their mobility schedules according to
their mobility preferences and the existing demand. In our
proposed GeoPresence-as-a-Service (GPaaS) brokered model
[4], on-demand market-priced GeoPresence-based services are
provided using the help of already roaming crowdsourced
agents, in which the broker acts as a proxy between ap-
plications with specific geo-temporal requests, and agents
capable of servicing these requests. The advantages of such
a framework is that by employing the help of the crowd, it
provides the same sensory power of dedicated GP-capable
systems without the cost of setting up a physical infrastructure.
Moreover, the use of crowdsourced resources as part of the
system allows for the development of new smart services and
applications that would have otherwise been impossible. Ex-
amples of such applications are ubiquitous sensing, on-demand
advertisements, smart surveillance, real-time traffic guidance,
on-demand health care services, on-demand transportation and
delivery, among many others.
In GPaaS, applications send in their geo-temporal requests
with their corresponding payoff functions, and mobile agents
to willingly participate in the system by sharing their journey
information, and their willingness to deviate from their regular
mobile paths, namely their flexibility. Agents have an envelope
of behaviors according their degree of flexibility, and they are
assumed to be under the disposal of the broker as long as
the decisions made by the broker are within that envelope,
and they are rewarded for their services in satisfying the geo-
temporal requests. The mobile agents are presumed to be
rational and selfish, and that they would not deviate from their
regular paths, i.e., offer to be flexible, unless given an incentive
to do so.
Scope and Contribution.
In this paper, we propose an incentive compatible route
coordination mechanism for crowdsourced resources, that can
be incorporated as part of GPaaS, specifically as an imple-
mentation of its resource allocation and payment services. For
resource allocation, we define the Flexible Route Coordination
(FRC) problem, in which an agents flexibility is exploited to
maximize their coverage on a mobility field, with an objective
to maximize the revenue of the system 1 collected from
satisfied paying requests. Given that the FRC problem is NP-
hard, we define an optimal algorithm to plan the route of a
single agent on a graph with evolving labels, then we use that
algorithm to define a 12 -approximation algorithm to solve the
problem in its general model, with multiple agents.
On the other hand, deciding on agents’ payment in such
a crowdsourced setting is another crucial challenge, as it
has to be designed to not only reward the agents for their
participation and contribution to the revenue maximization
of the broker, but to also encourage them to report their
maximum flexibility in their mobile schedules. Formally, the
payment mechanism used has to be incentive compatible, i.e.,
guarantees that the agents’s best strategy is to report their true
maximum flexibility, and individually rational, i.e., guarantees
that it’s always rational for the agents to participate. Moreover,
the payment model has to be efficient, i.e., payments truly
represent an agent’s contribution to the system, and has to be
cash-positive, i.e., the broker never pays out of pocket. In this
paper, we propose to give each agent a fair share of the revenue
obtained by the broker according to his contribution. Using the
VCG economic model [25], we define a metric that measures
the true contribution of an agent to the system’s revenue, which
we then use to compute payments for participating agents that
guarantee their incentive compatibility and rationality.
In Section 2, we start by defining the Flexible Route
Coordination problem, with its corresponding algorithms. In
Section 3, we present a VCG-based approach to compute the
agents’ payments according to their contribution. In Section 4,
we experimentally evaluate the performance of both the route
coordination, and payment mechanisms on real mobile traces
in urban environments. Finally, we present a short review of
related work in Section 5, and conclude the paper with a
summary of our contributions, and present our future work.
II. EXPLOITING AGENT FLEXIBILITY FOR REVENUE
1We use the terms system and broker interchangeably in this paper, as they
both represent the central authority coordinating the resources and satisfying
demand.
MAXIMIZATION
We consider an offline model of allocation service in GPaaS,
i,e, request and agent information are completely known before
the resource allocation is performed. To enable such an offline
process, we assume that the allocation service runs on only the
requests and agents available at the beginning of an epoch. We
define an epoch as a sequence of discrete time steps, in which
the properties of the mobility field, the requests and the agents
don’t change. Requests and agents may reappear in multiple
epochs, given that their temporal properties correspond to that
epoch.
In this section, we define the Flexible Route Coordination
problem as a model of resource allocation in GPaaS. We
define an optimal routing algorithm for the problem with a
single agent, and prove that it’s NP-hard to solve with multiple
agents. Finally, we use the single-agent algorithm proposed
to define a greedy 12 -approximation algorithm for the general
problem model with multiple agents.
A. Demand and Resource Specification
We model the structure of the mobility field, i.e., map of city
or locale, as a graph G = (V,E) in which the set of vertices
V represents the various landmarks in the field, and the set
of edges E represents the links between these landmarks.
Movement between landmarks, i.e along an edge, is done in
a single discrete time step, and the graph properties do not
change through time.
An agent is defined by its journey, and is represented as
(v0, t0, vd, td), in which the agent’s start location, and earliest
time of departure are represented by v0 and t0 respectively,
and its destination location, and latest time of arrival are
represented by vd and td respectively. An agent’s incurred cost
for traversing a path on the graph G is 0, as long as it departs
from the start location after the earliest departure time, and
arrives at the destination before its corresponding latest time
of arrival, and is ∞ otherwise.
A request in R is defined by its geo-temporal properties, and
payoff function, (v¯, t¯, val(t¯′)), in which the location vi ∈ V
is the ith desired location of the request, and ti is the corre-
sponding time for visiting that location. The payoff function,
val(t¯′), represents the valuation of servicing the request at
different times, and is usually defined to be maximum at the
desired locations, v¯, and corresponding times, t¯.
B. Route Coordination to Maximize Revenue
We aim to maximize the revenue achieved from satisfy-
ing geo-temporal requests, by exploiting agents’ flexibility to
increase coverage. Formally, we define an agent’s flexibility
as a measure of its tolerance of delay, and it’s the difference
between its specified latest time of arrival at a destination, and
its earliest time of arrival, i.e., when shortest path is used. This
flexibility generates an envelope of different-length feasible
paths, all of which fulfill the agent’s journey, with negligible
cost incurred by the agent.
Problem Definition. Given the mobility field graph G, a
list of requests R, and a list of agents A as defined above, the
Flexible Route Coordination (FRC ) problem is that of finding
a feasible path for each agent in the list A that maximizes the
revenue of the system. The revenue of the system is defined as
the total payoff obtained from the satisfied requests as defined
by their payoff functions, and according to the actual times
of their satisfaction. Moreover, a feasible path has to fulfill
the journey constraints as defined by the agent, i.e., start at
its desired start location, v0, at a time no earlier than t0, and
arrive at the destination, vd, at a time no later than td.
1) FRC with a Single Agent: Given a single agent, we
define an exact polynomial-time algorithm, namely the Flex-
Routing algorithm, to find the optimal path to be traversed by
that agent, which fulfills the agent’s journey and maximizes
the system’s revenue. The algorithm is inspired by dynamic
source routing mechanisms adopted in ad-hoc networks [14],
in which the graph nodes forward path information to their
neighbors over multiple rounds in an attempt to find the
optimal path, with some maximum length, from a source node
to a destination node.
The Flex-Routing Algorithm.
Given an instance of the FRC problem with a single agent,
(G, a = (v0, t0, vd, td), R), we use the information in R to
create a temporal graph GR, which is basically a copy of
G = (V,E), with node labels that vary according to the time
step in {t0, ..., td}. GR is created by storing the information
of the requests payoff functions directly on the graph nodes
corresponding to their specified locations. The graph GR =
(N,E) is composed of a set of specially labeled nodes, each
of which correspond to a vertex in the original graph G, and a
set of edges equivalent to those in G. Each node in the graph
is labeled with the payoff details of requests in the form of
a set of 3-tuples of (r, t, val), which represent the request’s
valuation, val, of being satisfied at time step t.
Finding the optimal route for the agent a on G is equivalent
to finding the maximum revenue path on GR for a packet
originating from v0 at t0 to be sent to the destination vd
before the end of its lifetime at td. Route information is
encoded in path records, which are passed on from nodes to
their neighbors every time step between t0 and td. A path
record contains information about the geo-temporal properties
of a path, in addition to the requests satisfied on it, and the
payoff obtained from each request according to the time it was
satisfied.
As shown in Alg. 1, the Flex-Routing algorithm runs in a
sequence of rounds. In each round, the path records corre-
sponding to each node are updated according to the node’s
payoff labels. A path record is updated if an already satisfied
request on the path can be satisfied with a higher payoff, or if
a new request can be satisfied. Then, for each node, the path
record with the highest revenue is compared to the maximum-
revenue path record ever received by that node. If the recently
updated record provides an improved revenue, then it becomes
the new maximum-revenue record, and is copied to the record
list of all neighboring nodes, including itself.
To find the optimal route for an agent, a = (v0, t0, vd, td),
we start by creating an initial path record for the node corre-
Algorithm 1 The optimal Flex-Routing algorithm for finding
the maximum revenue path on a temporal graph.
1: Input: (G = (V,E), a = (v0, t0, vd, td), R)
2: Create GR
3: Create empty lists PR[|V |] and Best[|V |]
4: Create path record (rev(n0, t0)
5: Add record to all PR[i] : (0, vi) ∈ E
6: for t = t1 : td do
7: for i : 0→ |V | do
8: for r in PR[i] do
9: if rev(ni, t) > rev(r) then
10: Update the record
11: Get maximum record r∗
12: if rev(r∗) > Best[i] then
13: Add record to all PR[j] : (vi, vj) ∈ E
14: Output: Best[vd]
sponding to v0 at t0. The revenue of the record is computed
according to the node’s payoff labels, and is forwarded to
all neighboring nodes as well as the node representing v0
itself. Then, d rounds of the algorithm are executed, with path
records updated and forwarded in each round. Finally, at td,
the maximum-revenue path record at the node corresponding
to the destination vd is chosen as the final decision of the
routing algorithm.
Analysis.
For a journey of duration d time units, on a graph with |V |
nodes, the Flex-Routing algorithm runs in d rounds. Within
each round, each node goes through at most |V | route records
to update, and finally sends at most a single record to its
neighbors (at most the |V |). Thus, the Flex-Routing algorithm
is polynomial, and terminates in O(d.|V |2) steps.
To prove that the Flex-Routing algorithm optimally solves
the FRC problem with a single agent optimally, we start by
proving that it does indeed find the optimal path of length d
between a pair of source and destination nodes on the temporal
graph GR.
Lemma 1: At the end of each round in the Flex-Routing
algorithm, the route record forwarded by a node always
represents the local optimal path, of duration equal to the
round index, from the source node to that node.
Proof: At each round ti in the Flex-Routing algorithm,
each node has a list of route records for routes with a duration
of i time units. Since a node only forwards a route record if
the route has the highest revenue observed at the node so
far, we guarantee that the route in that record is indeed the
optimal route of duration i time units from the source node
to that node. Also, since nodes forward the route records to
themselves as well, we guarantee that waiting at the nodes is
allowed, if it achieves a higher revenue.
Theorem 1: The Flex-Routing algorithm always computes
the optimal path on a temporal graph.
Proof: Since the algorithm is executed on the graph GR,
on which only positive payoff functions between t0, and td
are recorded, and since the initial route record is created at
time t0, and execution ends at td, we guarantee that the route
chosen by the algorithm always satisfies the agent’s journey.
Moreover, following Lemma 1, we guarantee that in the
final round of Flex-Routing , the algorithm will produce the
optimal paths of lengths d from the source node to every other
node, including the destination. Thus, the local optimal route
record stored at the destination vertex at round td represents
the optimal path according to the agent’s journey, and the
requests in the system.
Since the revenues encoded on the nodes in GR are obtained
from the set of geo-temporal requests R, and since the
optimality of a path in the Flex-Routing algorithm is defined as
the total maximum revenue from visiting the nodes. Moreover,
since the Flex-Routing algorithm is defined in a way that only
considers the revenue of visiting a request on a node at most
once, we guarantee that the path found by the algorithm is
equivalent to the optimal path as defined in the FRC problem.
2) FRC with Multiple Agents: In the general case of
allocation, with multiple agents, the allocation algorithm uses
the information provided by the n agents, to decide on an
outcome, i.e., a set of feasible paths for the agents, that
maximizes the revenue of the system. We define an agent’s
welfare, wi(R), as the maximum revenue the agent is able
to collect from a set of requests R according to its journey
constraints, which can be computed optimally using the Flex-
Routing algorithm above. By this definition of an agent’s
welfare, maximizing the revenue of the system can be achieved
by maximizing the sum of the individual agents’ welfare.
Formally, Given a set of requests, R, with predefined payoff
functions, and a set of n agents with predefined journeys
over a mobility graph, we can maximize the system’s revenue
by partitioning the requests into mutually exclusive subsets,
R1, ..., Rn, and assigning them to the n agents such that∑n
i=1 wi(Ri) is maximized.
Lemma 2: An agent’s welfare function, as computed by the
optimal Flex-Routing algorithm, is submodular.
Proof: On the set of requests, R, a submodular function
is a set function f : 2R → R, where 2R denotes the power set
of R, if for every X ⊆ Y ⊆ R, and ∀r ∈ R\Y , we have that
f(X ∪ {r}) − f(X) ≥ f(Y ∪ {r}) − f(Y ) [10]. Given our
definition of the agent’s welfare function, f(X) represents the
revenue achieved by the agent when attempting to satisfy the
requests in X , and similarly for Y . Since X ⊆ Y , it results
in one of two options; either the path chosen to satisfy Y has
a longer duration for an increased revenue, or it’s exactly as
long as that chosen for X for the same revenue.
Assuming the two paths have the same duration, adding a
new request r to either of them would have the same exact
effect, leading to equivalent values of f(X∪{r})−f(X), and
f(Y ∪{r})− f(Y ). On the other hand, if the path chosen for
f(Y ) was longer and the request r is added to it, the payoff
received from satisfying the request will never be more than
its payoff when satisfied with the smaller subset of the path,
because that request can never be reached at a better time to
achieve a higher payoff in the longer path. Thus, it always
happens that f(X ∪ {r})− f(X) ≥ f(Y ∪ {r})− f(Y ).
Theorem 2: The FRC problem with multiple agents is NP-
hard.
Proof: According to Lemma 2, an agent’s welfare func-
tion is a submodular function, resulting in our problem being
equivalent to that of the submodular welfare maximization
problem [29], which is known to be NP-hard.
The Greedy-FRC Algorithm.
The Greedy-FRC algorithm is a greedy heuristic, which
aims to find the set of mutually exclusive subsets R1, ..., Rn
to be assigned to each agent, such that R1∪ ...∪Rn = R, and
the total welfare of the agents is maximized. In the Greedy-
FRC algorithm, requests are initially sorted according to their
maximum payoff, then each requests is assigned to the agent
that can achieve the highest marginal increase in its welfare by
satisfying the request as part of its journey. Once a request is
assigned to an agent, it cannot be removed, but can be satisfied
for a lower payoff if the agent had to change its path to satisfy
another request, and maximize its overall welfare.
Algorithm 2 The greedy Greedy-FRC approximation algo-
rithm.
1: Input: A, R, G
2: Create empty lists Result[n], Welfare[n], x[n]
3: Sort R by max payoff
4: for each rj in R do
5: for each ai in A do
6: x[i] = Flex-Routing (G, ai, Result[i] ∪ rj)
7: Find ai with maximum (x[i]−Welfare[i])
8: Result[i] = Result[i] ∪ rj
9: Welfare[i] = x[i]
10: Output: R[1], ..., R[n]
Theorem 3: The Greedy-FRC algorithm is a 12 -
approximation algorithm.
Proof: Given that it has been proven in [24], [29]
that a greedy algorithm as described aboce provides a 12 -
approximation for the submodular welfare maximization prob-
lem, it follows that our proposed greedy algorithm is a 12 -
approximation as well.
III. INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE PAYMENTS
The key of maximizing the system’s revenue according to
the FRC problem is to exploit the agents’ reported flexibil-
ity, i.e., use their tolerance of delay to cover the graph at
different times, satisfying the available requests. Increased
agent flexibility increases the system’s revenue, but also
increases the agent’s inconvenience. Since an agent’s true
flexibility is private to the agent, a rational agent might report
less flexibility untruthfully, if it increases its own utility 2.
Therefore, we propose using mechanism design principles,
specifically the intuition behind the Clarke-Pivot rule used
2In our model, we assume that agents will never report a higher flexibility
than their true maximum flexibility, since higher flexibility always puts them
at a disadvantage
in VCG mechanisms [25], to give the agents an incentive to
reveal their private information truthfully to the broker, i.e.,
the decision maker, and avoid strategic signaling.
In GPaaS, agents report their flexibility values as a part
of their journey information at the beginning of an epoch,
and cannot change them during the allocation, i.e., route
coordination, process. Formally, we say that each agent i has a
privately known type θi that corresponds to that agent’s private
flexibility value, and we denote by Θi the space of all of agent
i’s possible types. An agent’s preference of a certain outcome
is defined by its utility function, ui : Θi × O → <, where
ui(θi, o) represents the agent’s utility for outcome o ∈ O
when the agent has type θi ∈ Θi. An agent’s utility function
is publicly known by all other agents, but the exact utility of
an agent for an outcome is only privately known by the agent
as it depends on its type.
A. Valuations and Utilities
Given a set of agents A and a set of requests R, let the
outcome o ∈ O be the outcome of an allocation decision.
This outcome is in the form of subsets of requests allocated to
each agent R1, ..., Rn, which represents the optimal solution
of the FRC problem with inputs R and A : |A| = n. An
agent i’s valuation of an outcome is defined as the maximum
revenue that can be achieved by the agent from being assigned
its corresponding subset of requests according to its reported
flexibility value, i.e., its welfare. Given a subset of requests
Ri, the welfare of an agent can be computed optimally using
the Flex-Routing algorithm defined in II-B1.
vi(θ
′
i, o = R1, ..., Rn) = wi(Ri) (1)
To measure an agent’s effect on the total revenue achieved
by the broker, we define a measure of its degree of contribution
to the system, namely the redundancy score. An agent’s
redundancy score is derived from the Clarke-Pivot rule, and is
defined as the difference between the maximum social welfare
of the system from an allocation not including the agent,
and the maximum social welfare of the other agents from an
allocation including the agent.
RSi =
∑
j 6=i
vj(θ
′
j , o−i)−
∑
j 6=i
vj(θ
′
j , o) (2)
In which o is the outcome of an allocation decision made
with all agents, and o−i is the outcome of an allocation
decision made without the agent. A higher score indicates that
more of the revenue achieved by the agent can be covered by
the other agents, which indicates the agent’s weaker contribu-
tion to the system.
Finally, we define an agent’s utility of an outcome ui :
Θi × O → < as the difference between its welfare from
the outcome, given its true maximum flexibility value, and
its redundancy score.
ui(θi, o) = vi(θi, o)−RSi (3)
B. Payment and Truthfulness
Since the agents’ true flexibility values affect allocation
decisions, and are only privately known by them, we propose
to share the revenue achieved by the broker with all agents
participating in satisfying demand according to their contribu-
tion to that revenue. For each agent participating in satisfying
requests, and contributing with some revenue to the broker,
it’s paid a portion of its achieved revenue according to the
following.
pi(θ
′i, o) = vi(θ′i, o)−RSi (4)
The intuition behind this payment function is that it’s
maximized as the agent’s redundancy score decreases, and
valuation out of an allocation outcome based on its reported
flexibility value increases.
Theorem 4: The payment model is incentive compatible,
individually rational, efficient, and cash-positive.
Proof:
Incentive Compatibility.
An agent i can increase his utility by reporting an untruthful
flexibility value θ′i to either increase his valuation of an
outcome based on its reported flexibility value, or to decrease
his redundancy score. Since an agent’s valuation is defined
as his welfare from an outcome, the only way an agent can
increase his valuation is by reporting a higher flexibility value,
which is not possible because a higher flexibility valuation that
the truthful one is not feasible and not in Θi.
As for lying to affect the value of the redundancy score, the
score is defined using the Clarke pivot rule, which makes it
non-vulnerable to manipulation by an agent, since it does not
depend in any way on the agent’s reported flexibility valuation.
Individual Rationality.
Since the outcome produced by the allocation decision al-
gorithm represents the optimal allocation given the agent’s
reported values, we can always guarantee that an agent’s
redundancy score is never larger than the agent’s welfare.
Therefore, the agent’s utility is always greater than or equal
to zero.
Efficiency
Since the payment function computes payments considers both
the agent’s redundancy score, and his valuation of the reported
outcome, we guarantee that the payment model is efficient.
Cash-positivity.
The outcome produced by the allocation decision algorithm
represents the optimal allocation given the agent’s reported
values. Therefore, we can always guarantee that when an agent
is removed from the allocation decision, the social welfare
of the other agents is never worse that when the agent is
considered for allocation. Therefore, the redundancy score is
never negative, its payment is never more that the revenue it
achieves, and the system never faces a negative utility.
Discussion. We note that our proposed payment model guar-
antees truthfulness as an ex-post Nash equilibrium strategy,
since an agent’s utility depends on the reported valuations
of the other agents, as well as the outcome of the allocation
decision. Although this payment model has all the advantages
of being efficient, incentive compatible, rational, cash-positive,
and computationally inexpensive, we are still working on
developing it further to provide profit guarantees for the
broker. Moreover, VCG-based mechanisms are vulnerable to
collusions, and monopoly situations, which might occur in a
real scenario if multiple agents are controlled by the same
entity.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The purpose of the evaluations is to analyze the mecha-
nism’s allocation and payment models under different model
instantiations. In this section, we present our simulation setting
and evaluation results.
A. Simulation Setting
To generate a diverse set of instantiations from the FRC
problem model, we develop our own simulator, which emu-
lates the mobility field settings, as well as the agents and the
request on the field. The graph representing the mobility is of a
grid topology, in which the nodes represents GPS coordinates
of the city of San Francisco in the form of longitude and lati-
tude values. Requests and agents information are generated at
the beginning of each epoch, and all simulations are performed
with complete knowledge, in which the set of generated agents
and requests are processed as batches in an offline manner.
Request Model.
Requests are created with randomly chosen locations, dis-
tributed uniformly over the mobility field, and with temporal
demand that is generated according to an exponential distri-
bution with a mean that is a parameter of the simulation. All
requests can share their allocated agents with other requests,
and have homogeneous types of sensory demands, but each
request has to be satisfied by a single agent. Moreover, all
requests have the same payment functions, which is defined
as a linearly decreasing function in both directions of time, i,e,
the maximum payoff of a request is achieved if it’s satisfied
at its defined time, and that payoff decreases by a single unit
for every time step for being satisfied earlier or later. In the
experiments below, we set the mean temporal rate of requests
to be 1/10 of a time unit, and all requests have a maximum
valuation of 50.
Agent Model.
In our evaluations, we apply two models for generating agents
on the mobility field. In the first model, which we use to evalu-
ate the behavior of our mechanisms in a perfectly independent
setting, we generate agents with randomly chosen locations,
distributed uniformly over the mobility field, and with tem-
poral demand that is generated according to an exponential
distribution with a mean that is a parameter of the simulation.
In the second model, agent’s journeys are generated from cab
mobility traces in San Francisco, USA [26], which we use
to define a journey’s start location, destination location, and
the expected duration of the journey. An agent’s flexibility is
defined as a fraction of its expected journey duration, i.e., a
flexibility factor of 0 indicates that the agent has to fulfill its
journey in minimum time, and a flexibility factor of 1 indicates
that the agent has a tolerance for delay as originally recorded
in the traces. As for the start time of an agent’s journey, we
assume that journeys’ inter-start times follow an exponential
distribution, and we generate these start times accordingly.
Performance metrics.
In each simulation, we evaluate the system’s achieved revenue,
payment, participation rate, and per-agent benefit ratio. The
system’s achieved revenue is the total payoff collected from
satisfied requests, its payment is the summation of payments
made to all agents satisfying requests, and the participation
rate is the ratio between agents generating revenue, and the
total number of participating agents. An agent’s benefit is the
ratio between the payment an agent receives, and the revenue
it achieves.
Fig. 1: When agents are randomly distributed over the mobility
field, the marginal utility of increasing flexibility is low, due
to original journey constraints.
Fig. 2: When agents are randomly distributed over the mobility
field, every extra agent considered for allocation increases the
area of coverage, leading to higher revenue. Moreover, the size
of the newly covered area depends on the agents flexibility
values.
B. Experiments and Results
1) Behavior with Synthesized Agents: To evaluate the effect
of agents’ density, i.e., the number of available agents per
unit time, and agent’s flexibility on the revenue obtained from
satisfied requests in a perfect setting with independent agents,
we create journeys that are distributed uniformly over the
mobility field. The results in Fig. 1 represent the increase in
revenue as we vary the agents’ true flexibility value. The slow
increase in revenue for higher flexibility exemplifies the effect
of the journey constraints, the start and destination locations,
on the ability of agents to reach far requests.
On the other hand, as a new agent is added to the mobility
field at a random location, it adds a new coverage area. Thus,
increasing the possibility of satisfying more requests, and
increasing revenue. In Fig. 2, we can see that the marginal
increase of revenue caries according to the degree of flexibility
of the agents, which is indicative of the effect of the agent’s
flexibility on the size of his coverage area.
Fig. 3: An increased distribution of agents over the mobility
field leads to higher revenue, but the marginal increase of
revenue with increased flexibility always decreases for higher
flexibility values.
2) Behavior with Real Traces: In the next set of experi-
ments, we evaluate the performance of the mechanism with
real traces from an urban environment, in which agents’
journeys are usually not independent, as they are denser in
more populated areas. In most of the experiments below, we
set the agent density to be 5, unless otherwise notified.
We start by evaluating the performance of the allocation
and payment mechanisms with agents with different degrees
of randomization (R), i.e., randomized distribution over the
mobility field. In Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, we represent the revenue,
profit, and agent benefit of the allocation as the flexibility
increases, for different degrees of randomization.
In urban environments, agents tend to have increased lo-
cality, i.e., their journeys are denser in certain areas of the
mobility field. In terms of revenue, this leads to decreased rev-
a: Profit obtained from allocation with an agent density
of 2.
b: Agent benefit obtained from allocation with an agent
density of 7.
Fig. 4: An increased distribution of agents over the mobility
field reduced the systems profit, but increases the individual
agent benefit. Since agents are more distributed over the
mobility field, they have lower redundancy scores, and get
paid back most of the revenue that they achieve.
enue since the coverage areas of the agents overlap. However,
this overlap of coverage areas lead to an increased redundancy
score for agents, which leads to lower payments to them, and
higher profit to the broker.
For the next set of experiments, we compare the revenue
obtained from the Greedy-FRC algorithm to that of an multi-
stage single item auction-based algorithm (HG*) that we
proposed in [4]. In a single stage of the HG* algorithm, agents
bid over single requests, and the agent with the highest bid on
a request is assigned that request. After requests are assigned
to the highest bidding agents, the auction is repeated with the
leftover requests, and the agents with their updated journeys.
Moreover, we compare our payment mechanism to a second-
priced payment model that could be adopted in each single-
a: Revenue obtained from allocation with an agent
density of 2.
b: Revenue obtained from allocation with an agent
density of 7.
Fig. 5: Comparing the Greedy-FRC algorithm to the multi-
stage auction allocation algorithm, HG*, the revenue obtained
by Greedy-FRC is always higher. Moreover, second-priced
payments always lead to no profit for the broker.
item auction stage in HG* 3. As shown in Fig. 5, the profit
of using second-priced auctions is always zero, since it’s not
an efficient method to distribute payments to agents, and the
revenue obtained from the Greedy-FRC algorithm is never
worse than HG*.
In Fig. 3a, we noticed that the system’s profit spikes at
flexibility value of 1 for the set of agents with no random-
ization, R = 0, and density of 5. Also, in Fig.4b, with no
randomization and agent density of 7, the profit spikes at
flexibility value of 0.8. To further investigate this behavior,
we performed a couple more experiments using the set of
journeys as obtained from the real traces, and measured the
agents participation rate.
3Given that the second-priced auction payment mode is not incentive
compatible, we use the true flexibility valuations to compare the payments
mechanisms.
Fig. 6: The agents’ locality affects their participation rate as
their flexibility increases, which in turn affects their payments
and the broker’s profit. A decrease in agent participation is due
to their concentration in the city’s central area, which increases
their individual redundancy scores as their flexibility increases.
Fig. 7: At different agent density values, the participation rate
decreases at varying flexibility values. This decrease occurs
at critical congestion points, in which agents’ coverage areas
overlap, increasing their redundancy scores, which are directly
followed by increased participation as flexibility increases.
In Fig. 6, with agent density of 5, we present the relationship
between the revenue achieved, and the profit made in the
system, and the agents participation rate. We notice that due
to the increased locality of the agents, increasing flexibility
results in an increased revenue, and a corresponding increase
in profit. Until a certain congestion point is reached, in which
increasing the agents flexibility doesn’t enable them to satisfy
new demand, but rather affects them negatively by increasing
their redundancy score. This negative effect on the agents is
translated into a higher profit for the broker, which eventually
decreases again as agents flexibility increases, and they are
able to expand their coverage areas and satisfy new requests.
Similarly, in Fig. 7, we note the spikes in profit at various
flexibility values, accompanied with a decrease in participation
rate, followed by a decrease in profit.
V. RELATED WORK
Route Coordination.
Existing GeoPresence-capable systems can be categorized as
either infrastructure-based, or crowdsourced. In infrastructure-
based systems, agents are owned by an entity, and their actions
are controlled to optimize the system’s objective. In such
systems, agents can be stationary, as in traditional wireless
sensor networks [18]. Alternatively, agents can be mobile, as
in robotics [30], [11] and dedicated vehicular systems [20],
[7], with their journeys decided according to the system’s
constraints. Mobility control is widely used for field coverage
[13], maintenance of communication chains [9] or for specific
task accomplishment [23].
In crowdsourced GeoPresence-capable systems, agents are
self-motivated, with predefined schedules and uncontrolled
mobility patterns. They willingly participate in the system
and decide whether or not to perform a task. i.e., service a
request, according to their prior plans, and they may alter their
schedules to perform a task if given the right incentive to do
so. In existing crowdsourced systems, the request satisfaction
decision is performed solely by the agents, and the system
cannot dictate and/or predict their behavior. Examples of these
systems include enterprise-based crowdsourcing applications
as Amazon Mechanical Turk [3] and Uber [28], and oppor-
tunistic sensor networks as in [1], [31]. The spatio-temporal
request satisfaction process in such systems is opportunistic,
ad-hoc, and provides no quality-of-service guarantees.
Our proposed model lies under the crowdsourced systems
category, with an assumption that the self-motivated agents
allow for coordinated mobility patterns, which was first pro-
posed in [22], according to our knowledge.
Economical Models for Resource Allocation.
Economical models have long been incorporated in the re-
source allocation process in distributed systems, in which
resources are allocated to the demand using models such as
auctions, commodity markets, coalitions, and combinatorial
auctions. In systems with controlled mobile agents, auction-
based approaches have commonly been used to allow the
agents to bid for satisfying the demand that maximizes their
utility, as in [6], [19], [8], or to allow customers to bid for
cheaper, or more customized, resources [21], [17]. Although
these approaches seem successful in such settings, they are
not suitable for deciding on incentive compatible payments
in highly combinatorial optimization problems, in which the
agents’ themselves are crowdsourced, and contribute in the
system’s revenue.
In current systems with crowdsourced agents, prices are
either posted such as in Amazon Mechanical Turk [3], or
follow a commodity market model, as in Uber [28]. Recently,
mechanisms for pricing tasks in crowdsourced systems have
been proposed, such as bargaining mechanisms between cus-
tomers and agents [12], and incentive compatible mechanisms
that minimizes the customers cost under a budget [15], [27].
However, our mechanism model differs than these approaches
due to the geo-temporal properties of both the resources and
the demand.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed a novel incentive compatible
route coordination mechanism for mobile crowdsourced re-
sourced, which manages to maximize the revenue of the
system, with a guarantee that truthfulness is an ex-post Nash
equilibrium strategy. Our approach can be implemented as part
of our proposed GPaaS brokered model for satisfying geo-
temporal demand, or it can be used as a stand alone route co-
ordination mechanism on graphs with positive node attributes.
The mechanism is composed of two components; (1) A 12 -
approximation allocation algorithm for resources and demand
with specific geo-temporal constraints, and (2) A VCG-based
payment model that guarantees the truthfulness and rationality
of the participating agents. Moreover, we presented evaluation
results that support our theoretical analysis, and evaluate the
mechanism’s performance on traces from urban settings.
Our future work is in two directions; (1) The develop-
ment of route coordination mechanisms that would allow
for fault-tolerant resource allocation, and the development
of online allocation and payment mechanisms, which can
provide theoretical guarantees even with uncertain demand and
agent behavior, and (2) The implementation of the different
services of the GPaaS brokered model, including the resource
allocation and payment components, which we have presented
in this paper, as well as the application and agent interfaces,
and the quality control and the data analytic services.
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